







lectricity sector liberalisation is part of the
wider trend toward liberalisation and the with-
drawal of the state from involvement in infrastruc-
ture industries. The electricity liberalisation in the
European Union (EU) is the world’s most extensive
cross-jurisdiction reform program of the sector and
involves liberalisation of electricity markets in mem-
ber states and integration of the national markets.
The member countries include some of the world’s
pioneering countries (e.g. UK, Norway) as well as
slow-reforming countries (e.g. France, Greece). In
the absence of a centrally driven programme, the
pace of reform in the EU would have been consider-
ably slower.1
The electricity liberalisation trend in the EU is tak-
ing place amid a world-wide slow down in the pace
of reforms. The California electricity crises in
2000–01 and the 2003 blackouts in New York and
parts of Europe have dampened political enthusiasm
for reforms. In Latin America, political and public
support for reforms is on the decline. Elsewhere,
apart from some leading countries such as the
Nordic countries,Australia, New Zealand and Chile
there has been limited progress towards comprehen-
sive energy market reforms.
EU electricity reform is increasingly focused on mar-
ket integration and cross border issues, signalling
that it may be closer to realising a single market.
However a single market requires physical intercon-
nections and technical co-ordination between natio-
nal markets and raises important issues regarding
the framework within which market integration is
implemented.While individual countries have made
substantial progress toward liberalisation,the goal of
a single electricity market remains a long way off.
This paper reviews the state of electricity sector lib-
eralisation in the EU and discusses the prospects for
further progress towards an integrated European
market in the light of the recent challenges facing
the energy sector.
Electricity sector reforms
A successful liberalisation requires a suitable
structure for wholesale and retail electricity mar-
kets, transmission capacity and ancillary services,
independent oversight of competition, and regula-
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* The authors would like to thank David Newbery for detailed
comments and the EU’s SESSA project for providing a platform
for many in-depth discussions of the European electricity market.
All remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors. This
paper is a considerably shortened version of Jamasb and Pollitt
(2005).
** Tooraj Jamasb is Senior Research Associate at the Faculty of
Economics, University of Cambridge; Michael Pollitt is the Acting
Executive Director of the Electricity Policy Research Group,Judge
Business School, University of Cambridge.
1 Unless otherwise specified, with the EU electricity market we
generally refer to the EU-15 countries plus Norway and
Switzerland (EU-15 + 2) as the latter countries are closely associ-
ated with the Union.The 10 Accession Countries are not included
in this analysis.
Table 1 
Main steps inelectricity reform




• Horizontal splitting of generation
and supply.




• Allowing new entry into genera-
tion and supply.
• Establishing an independent
regulator.
• Provisionof third-party network 
access.
Regulation
• Incentive regulationof trans-
mission/distribution networks.
• Allowing new private actors. Ownership 
• Privatising the existing publicly
owned businesses.
 Source: Authors' compilation.CESifo DICE Report 2/2006 17
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tion of monopoly transmission and distribution
networks. Experience from around the world has
produced a measure of consensus over some
generic reform steps for achieving a well function-
ing market-oriented industry (Jamasb 2006;Joskow
1998; Newbery 2002a). Table 1 outlines the steps
for reforming a vertically integrated and publicly
owned ESI into a competitive and privately owned
industry.
The EU electricity liberalisation
Many of the liberalisation initiatives in Europe and
elsewhere began in the early 1990s in an atmosphere
of reduced concern over energy supply security.The
ending of the Cold War made imports of gas from
Russia less risky in an environment where markets
favoured the building of new gas-fired plants.An ini-
tial surplus of generation capacity facilitated the
reforms, as there was no pressing need to ensure
guaranteed returns to new investment.
European level reform has been pursued via the
EU Electricity Market Directives of 1996 and 2003
which: (i) required the members to take a mini-
mum set of steps by key dates toward the liberali-
sation of national markets, and (ii) initiated efforts
to strengthen the interfaces between national mar-
kets by improving cross-border transmission links
and trading rules.The EU has also subsidised some
cross-border transmission upgrades (e.g. between
Ireland and Great Britain).
The Directives focused on unbundling the industry
and the opening of national markets. The 2003
Directive further promotes competition by tough-
ening regulation of access to networks, requiring
independent regulators and regulation of cross-
border trade.2 The 2003 Directive required that all
non-household customers could choose a supplier
by 1 July 2004. By July 2007 it aims to achieve: (i)
unbundling of transmission and distribution sys-
tem operators (TSOs and DSOs), (ii) free entry to
generation, (iii) monitoring of supply competition,
(iv) full market opening, (v) promotion of renew-
ables, (vi) strengthening the role of the regulator
and (vii) a single market after a review to assess
obstacles to the single market in 2006 (Table 2).
Key reform steps in the EU
Restructuring
The aim of vertical unbundling is to separate the
potentially competitive generation and supply from
the natural monopoly networks.Effective separation
of generation from transmission is crucial for com-
petition in the wholesale market and to ensure non-
discriminatory access to networks. Unbundling can
take the form of functional, accounting, legal, or
ownership separation, the latter
being the most effective. In turn,
unbundling retail from distribu-
tion is important for retail com-
petition. In Britain, following
legal separation some distribu-
tors have left the retail business,
as it removed the scope for cross
subsidies, and non-integrated
businesses have taken market
share from incumbents.
The initial structural differences
and the flexibility allowed by the
first Directive have meant that
the EU countries have adopted
different approaches to separate
these functions. Evidence sug-
































Unbundling T/D None  Accounts Legal
Cross-border
trade 





TPA = thirdparty access.
  Source: Vasconcelos (2004).
2 Cross border trading rules are also cov-
ered by an additional regulation 1228/2003
on conditions for access to the network for
cross-border electricity exchanges.between generation and retail has a strong commer-
cial rationale as supply risks in the generation can be
insured against by integrating into retail. Table 3
shows the extent to which member countries have
separated networks from competitive activities using
the five best practice criteria. In many countries the
separation of TSOs has been more stringent than for
DSOs,as most have implemented ownership or legal
separation rather than accounting or management
separation.
Competition
Effective competition may require
horizontal unbundling of gene-
ration and retailing to reduce mar-
ket concentration. The Directives
do not require horizontal separa-
tion to control market concentra-
tion. However, in order to meet
market opening rules, ENEL of
Italy (30 percent state-owned) was
required to sell off 15,000 MW
capacity and EdF of France auc-
tioned some 6,000 MW capacity
(42 TWh energy) per year.In Eng-
land and Wales the largest genera-
tors were obliged to divest part of
their plant portfolio to other firms and later traded
horizontal divestitures for the right to integrate into
supply. In several significant European markets, com-
petition cannot be expected to operate without (fur-
ther) horizontal structural changes (e.g. in France).
Despite a mixed ownership structure, wholesale
competition is, at least in principle, complete in all
member countries, and large users and many small
consumers can freely choose their electricity suppli-
ers.The 2003 Directive raised the standards for com-
petition by ruling out the single-buyer model for dis-
tribution utilities (adopted by Northern Ireland,
Portugal and Italy) and requiring regulated third-
party access to distribution networks. Some coun-
tries have exceeded the minimum required levels
and have already extended market opening to
households (Figure 1).
Regulation
While regulation can oversee a competitive sector, it
is difficult to engineer drastic changes after initial
restructuring.The regulator should seek to minimise
regulatory uncertainty by establishing credible gov-
ernance rules. Where competitive and regulated
activities remain integrated, the regulator must
ensure that generators and retailers have non-dis-
criminatory third party access to networks. Network
charges typically constitute around one-third of final
prices but vary by over a factor of two across the EU,
signalling a potential for efficiency improvement.
Advances in regulation theory and practice attempt
to mimic market competition and several European
regulators have adopted various incentive-based
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Table 3 
























• TSO:  Ownership unbundling, Yes=1, No=0;
DSO: Legal unbundling, Yes=1, No=0
• Published accounts, Yes=1, No=0
• Compliance officer, Yes=1, No=0 
• Separate corporate identity, Yes=1, No=0,
 Often=0.5 
• Separate locations, Yes=1, No=0, Partly=0.5
a) Brussels region not yet legally unbundled and no 
compliance officer in Flanders region.












1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Actual market opening achieved
Expected market opening (1996-Directive)
Source: European Commission (2004b, 2005) and own calculations.
ACTUAL AND EXPECTED LEVELS OF MARKET OPENING
by units sold
in %
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schemes for regulation of networks using price caps
and benchmarking (Jamasb and Pollitt 2001).
Contrary to best practice advice of ex ante establish-
ment of independent regulators, the EU’s focus on
raising the standards of regulation came after the
restructuring drive.As a result, many European reg-
ulators are weak in the face of established incum-
bents.In Germany,despite full market liberalisation,
the regulator first took office only in July 2005.With
no independent regulator in place and a lack of
incentive-based regulation schemes, the network
charges in Germany have been among the highest in
Europe. Recognising the importance of regulation,
the 2003 Directive required establishment of inde-
pendent regulators.
Privatisation
The perceived benefit of privatisation is that the pur-
suit of profit leads to increased efficiency. Priva-
tisation can also provide significant proceeds for the
government and reduce its future liabilities (New-
bery and Pollitt 1997). Evidence suggests that pri-
vatisation can deliver benefits when combined with
effective restructuring, competition and regulation
(Newbery 1999;2002a).However,privatisation is not
a prerequisite for liberalisation.In Norway,competi-
tion and incentive regulation were applied to state,
county and municipality owned enterprises.
Privatisation has not been part of the EU’s drive
toward liberalisation. While the political rationale
for avoiding sovereign issues and delays is under-
standable, state ownership of dominant incumbents
(e.g.in Norway) can be conducive to competition.In
some countries, this has been resisted partly because
of fears of national companies falling into foreign
ownership (e.g. The Netherlands and Norway). In
Germany and Belgium, the industry was largely pri-
vately-owned before reform.The most extensive pri-
vatisation programs have taken place in the UK and
Portugal,while some countries have undertaken par-
tial privatisation (e.g. Italy and France).
Effects of reform
Market structure
While some outcomes of reforms can be difficult to
measure, the impacts on market structure have been
easier to observe. The financial integration of elec-
tricity markets in Europe has taken place more
rapidly than the integration of power flows and net-
works. In the absence of strict control of Mergers
and Acquisitions (M&As), European firms have
shown a marked tendency towards consolidation
and market concentration at national and EU levels
(Newbery 2002b; Codognet et al. 2002).This may in
turn limit the effectiveness of competition.
Horizontal concentration
The legacy of pre-reform public ownership and cen-
tralised control through national companies (e.g. in
France, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Ireland) has
ensured that horizontal concentration remains high
in many countries. While some reforms have led to
reduced concentration in generation and retailing
(e.g. England and Wales, and the Nordic market),
they remain exceptions rather than the norm.
Among the EU-15, concentration in generation for
the largest three generation firms remains above
60 percent in 10 markets (by installed capacity). In
retailing there is a similar picture with the three-firm
concentration ratio remaining above 60 percent in
12 markets (by number of customers).3
European utilities have been keen to position them-
selves in the emerging market and have moved more
quickly than national and European decision-mak-
ers. Some acquisitions have involved considerable
premiums reflecting the acquiring firms’ expecta-
tions. More than two-thirds of the European market
is owned by eight large companies, with the Europe-
wide four-firm concentration ratio at 50 percent.The
ownership structures are complex and include many
partial shareholdings. Moreover, inter-fuel competi-
tion between gas and electricity seems to be benefi-
cial for the single energy market, and therefore the
merger tendency between gas and electricity firms
can restrain competition.
Vertical integration
In pre-liberalisation electricity sectors, vertically inte-
grated structures had apparent economic and techni-
cal advantages and were a convenient organisational
arrangement for state-owned sectors. While reforms
have attempted to reduce this,profit-oriented and pri-
vatised utilities have exhibited tendencies toward ver-
tical (re)integration through domestic and cross-bor-
der M&As. Vertically integrated electricity utilities
3 Concentration figures are from European Commission (2005).have been among the most active
in European M&As and have
tended to acquire other vertically
integrated companies (Codognet
et al. 2002). In Great Britain, the
retail margin appears to have in-
creased with higher concentration
resulting from M&As as the num-
ber of national competitors in
supply has fallen and the degree
of integration between generators
and suppliers has increased.
Despite the obvious problems
associated with increased market
concentration, national and sup-
ranational regulators have been
relatively inactive in tackling the issue (Thatcher
2002). The desire to create national champions may
have constrained intervention to create a diversified
ownership structure.Also,M&A decisions are usual-
ly the responsibility of national competition agen-
cies, and it is not clear that these agencies are suffi-
ciently aware of the dynamics and complexities of
electricity markets.A competent energy regulator is




The effect on electricity prices is, perhaps, the single
most important indicator of liberalisation. A desir-
able outcome for the single market is to achieve
lower average EU-wide tariffs and price conver-
gence through wholesale and retail competition.
A decline in the price-cost margin may suggest effi-
ciency gains and that these have been passed on to
customers. Liberalisation may also involve rebalanc-
ing of tariffs for different customer groups as a result
of cost-reflective pricing.The picture is further com-
plicated by changes in prices for gas, oil and coal.
There is a significant variation in end-user prices in
the EU, although this can be associated with differ-
ent components of the final price (European
Commission 2004b). The integrated Nordic market
exhibits higher degree of wholesale price conver-
gence than other European markets reflecting limit-
ed interconnection capacity (Boisseleau 2004;Bower
2002). Italy and Ireland exhibit notably high genera-
tion prices and retail margins.4 At the same time,
Norway and UK (with the longest incentive regula-
tion of networks) have some of the lowest network
charges. The UK exhibits the lowest retail supply
cost and margin.
The EU average prices for major customer groups
have seen a general decline between 1997 and 2003
(Figure 2). The price reductions for households,
small industries and large industries have been 6, 20,
and 9.5 percent respectively.Prices for the customers
seem to have come more in line with the underlying
costs of supply, which would suggest that residential
prices should be higher than those of small indus-
tries. This has arisen against a background of flat or
rising fossil fuel prices for electricity generation over
this period.5 It also comes at a time when operating
costs seem to have been falling,combined with sharp
declines in employment in recent years. Labour pro-
ductivity in the utilities (including electricity) sectors
has increased by about 30 percent between 1996 and
2001 (European Commission 2004a).
Distribution tariffs vary significantly, although less
than for transmission tariffs (the distribution charges
in Germany are twice those in the UK and explain
more than half of the differential in the final prices
between the two countries). There are also signifi-
cant variations in distribution tariffs within individ-
ual countries that reflect legitimate cost variations,
inefficiency, the use of distribution charges as local
taxes by municipal owners, or even joint cost alloca-
tions within vertically integrated businesses cross-
subsidising competitive segments such as retailing










1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Average EU household price
Average EU small industry price
Average EU large industry price
Source: European Commission (2005, 2004b) and inflation rate (unweighted).
EU AVERAGE REAL PRICE
2004 euro per MWh
Figure 2
4 Generation fuel taxes vary across countries (see IEA 2004).
5 There is only patchy data available on fossil fuel prices on a con-
sistent basis (see IEA 2004).CESifo DICE Report 2/2006 21
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from monopoly segments. Incentive regulation has
led to concerns about the effect on the quality of ser-
vice, which exhibits variations both across and with-
in countries (CEER 2003). However quality of ser-
vice is usually explicitly incentivised.
Investment adequacy
In the absence of central planning, the market must
deliver sufficient and timely investments – a major
concern in liberalised electricity markets. Assessing
the incentives for future investment adequacy is dif-
ficult due to pre-existing over-capacity. However,
over time, as demand and supply move more into
balance,new investment with the promise of an ade-
quate return will be needed. A period of high de-
mand growth and sustained under-investment can
eradicate the existing reserve capacity and threaten
the stability of the system, especially where this is
combined with a lack of political will to allow prices
to rise.
It is expected that the financial and physical inte-
gration of the European electricity market would
cause its profitability to converge. It is more dif-
ficult to determine whether the return is at an ef-
ficient level and whether it will lead to sufficient
new investment. In Norway, in recent years, the
return on capital for electricity utilities has been
lower than that of the manufacturing industries
(von der Fehr et al. 2005). This gives rise to the
question as to whether electricity is less risky than
other industries, thus justifying lower returns.
Meanwhile,much of the electricity infrastructure in
Europe is aging and there is a need for significant
asset renewal in coming years. Given the long eco-
nomic life of such assets, it is
important to ensure the effi-
ciency and strategic value of the
new investments.
Security of supply
Figure 3 shows changes in the
remaining capacity in the Union
for the Co-ordination of Trans-
mission of Electricity (UCTE)
system, which consists of the
transmission networks in conti-
nental Europe between 1999 and
2003. Overall, reserve capacity in
the post-liberalisation year ap-
pears to have been relatively sta-
ble.Reserve capacity for the peri-
od between May and July 2003 is somewhat lower than
previous years. With the exception of February, the
reserve capacity for the colder months of the year has
generally improved. We note that this data is rather
crude and does not include intra-month peaks or
reflect variations in the likelihood of an outage at the
same measured reserve margin. A better measure
would be given by the loss of load probability.
In the short run, increased trade and interconnec-
tions can improve utilisation of existing capacity.
Individual countries can maintain a degree of
domestic energy security by limiting reliance on
import dependence. The best insurance policies
against interruptions in energy flows are national
reserve policies and effective EU-wide crisis man-
agement and sharing of reserves.
Environmental and social impact 
Between 1992 and 2001, the share of renewables as
a percentage of targets for 2010 in seven countries
declined or remained the same.For the whole of the
EU during the same period, the share of renew-
ables increased to about 10 percent (European
Commission 2004a). However, progress towards
target levels has been uneven and the European
market integration does not appear to stand in the
way of different national emphasis on renewables.
The trade-off between achieving lower prices
through reforms and environmental concerns about
demand growth may be reduced by low carbon and
clean technologies.
Between 1996 and 2001, EU electricity prices have
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Source: UCTE (1999, 2000, 2003, 2005).
REMAINING CAPACITY WITHOUT EXCHANGES AS PERCENTAGE OF 
TOTAL GENERATING CAPACITY IN UCTE
Figure 3sumer price index. During this period, the afford-
ability index for electricity improved for all income
groups in most member countries and consumers
appear to be generally satisfied with service quali-
ty (European Commission 2004a). Recent increas-
es in fuel prices have ended this benign period of
declining real prices. The ability of regulators to
pass efficiency gains from liberalisation to cus-
tomers will be increasingly important for contin-
ued public acceptability of further integration of
European markets.
Conclusions and policy implications
The centralised approach to market liberalisation in
the EU has succeeded in maintaining the pace of
reform in the original EU-15 and in a number of
associated and accession countries. Given the initial
diversity across EU electricity sectors,the Directives
have achieved a degree of standardisation of struc-
tures, institutions and rules in national markets.
Market opening has proceeded rapidly and in many
cases, beyond the minimum requirements.
While progress toward a genuine single market
remains slow there has been progress in regional
markets. There are several recognisable regional
markets in the EU: the Nordic, UK-Ireland, Baltic,
east European,west European,southeast European,
Iberian and Italian zonal markets. However, these
markets vary in degree of internal integration. The
Nordic market is the most advanced with formal and
common market rules and price convergence, while
the Iberian market is taking shape. The west Euro-
pean market (including France, Germany, Swit-
zerland, Netherlands and Belgium) is the largest re-
gional market, and its central geographic position
implies that progress toward the single market de-
pends on the development of this market.
Liberalisation and integration of the European mar-
ket remains a work in progress characterised by
uncertainty over its end point. Effective unbundling,
regulation and competition are required for a com-
petitive market. This requires that decision makers
need to take action to:
– promote extension of regional markets,
– encourage expansion of interconnector capacity
to facilitate cross border competition,
– unbundle networks and regulate and enforce
accesss arrangements effectively,
– block anti-competitive rises in concentration via
mergers,
– develop arrangements to secure a collective
reserve capacity and to prevent free-riding, and
– enforce disclosure, transparency, and the collec-
tion and publication of new types of data that
would allow proper monitoring of liberalisation
progress.
Decision makers must make sure that market
incentives are allowed to work in order to avoid a
return to monopolies of the past. The process of
referring merger cases to competition authorities
has been ineffective in preventing market concen-
tration. Many of the required measures can be left
to national governments/regulators, but where
these do not take sufficient action the European
Commission must have the authority to intervene
to achieve a genuine European single market in
electricity.
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